Fighting Words, Hate Speech and Symbolic Speech

Chaplinsky v. N.H. (1942)

Terminiello v. Chicago (1949)

Facts: Arthur Terminiello, a former Catholic priest who became an anti-Communist crusader, gave a shrill, anti-Semitic speech at an auditorium in Chicago as an angry mob of about a thousand protestors threw bricks and bottles, smashed windows and nearly broke into the hall. Terminiello was fined $100 for breach of the peace, which the judge defined as including speech which "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition or unrest, or creates a disturbance."

On appeal, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court threw out his conviction as a violation of Terminiello’s 1st Amendment rights. Justice Douglas noted that “a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.

Douglas sidestepped the question whether Terminiello’s words were fighting words, and by doing so, helped narrow the scope of the fighting words doctrine. Justice Jackson, dissenting, argued that the “danger of rioting and violence in response to the speech was clear, present and immediate,” and that the state has the responsibility to punish someone who toches off a public riot. “No mob has ever protected any liberty, even its own, but if not put down it always winds up in an orgy of lawlessness which respects no liberties… The choice is not between order and liberty. It is between liberty with order and anarchy without either. There is danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”

Significance: Court throws doubt on fighting words doctrine and the idea of the "heckler's veto," or the idea that the reaction of the listener(s) can determine whether or not speech is constitutionally punishable. Justice Jackson seems to be saying that when provocative speech incites a mob, the state does have a right to punish the speaker.

 

Skokie v. National Socialist Party (1978)

(Search Lexis/Nexis Academic under this case name)

 

R.A.V. vs. St. Paul (1992)

UWM Post v. UW Regents (1991)

 

U.S. v. O’Brien (1968)

 

Texas v. Johnson (1989)

Listen to Adam Liptak, New York Times legal writer, on hate speech in America

 

Expressive conduct flowchart

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