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Libel

The Supreme Court deals with the First Amendment limits on libel law

Case

Facts

Significance

New York Times v. Sullivan (1964)

Montgomery, Ala., police commissioner L.B. Sullivan sues The New York Times for libel for full-page advertisement accusing Montgomery police of numerous civil rights violations. Some facts are wrong. Alabama jury awards Sullivan $500,000 in damages; verdict upheld by Alabama Supreme Court. U.S. Supreme Court reverses.

For the first time, U.S. Supreme Court weighs the First Amendment protection given to the press against the rights of a "public official" to sue for libel. Court declares that allowing public officials to recover for a few inaccuracies in a news story about them is tantamount to reviving laws of seditious libel punishing criticism of rulers; robust debate in a democratic society requires that public officials must jump a higher hurdle to recover for libel by showing that story was published with "actual malice," that is, with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard as to whether it was false or not.

Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts (1967)

Univ. of Georgia athletic director Wally Butts sues Saturday Evening Post for article accusing him of fixing 1962 game with Alabama. "Muckraking" story published on the basis of unreliable source; magazine failed to check facts with other witnesses or scrutinize game films. Supreme Court defines Butts as a "public figure" who must prove actual malice and decides magazine's actions constitute reckless disregard.

Supreme Court extends actual malice test to public figures, who "command sufficient continuing public interest and have sufficient access to the means of counterargument to be able 'to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies' of the defamatory statements." Court also delineates the type of sloppy journalism that constitutes reckless disregard of the facts.

AP v. Walker (1967)

In companion case to Butts, AP reporter files eyewitness account of how retired army General Edwin Walker had encouraged rioters' violence during integration of the University of Mississippi in 1962. Supreme Court reverses $500,000 libel award to Walker.

Court holds Walker became a public figure by "thrusting...his personality into the 'vortex' of an important public controversy." In contrast to Butts case, Court considers deadline pressures faced by AP reporter and the "rapid and confused occurrence of events," finds no evidence of prejudice or incompetence, and no "actual malice."

Harte-Hanks Communications Inc. v. Connaughton (1989)

Front-page story in Hamilton (Ohio) Journal News accuses judicial candidate Daniel Connaughton of conspiring to blackmail incumbent judge, whom newspaper endorsed. Connaughton sues for libel. Jury awards him $200,000, finding that newspaper, possibly motivated by bias in favor of his opponent, failed to adequately check out information from its principal source. Eg., editors and reporters did not listen to a tape recording of another witness who could have shot holes in the source's story. Supreme Court affirms libel verdict.

After an exhaustive review of the trial evidence, Supreme Court rules that reckless disregard branch of actual malice test is met as there was clear and convincing proof of a purposeful avoidance of truth: "it is likely that the newspaper's inaction was a product of a deliberate decision not to acquire knowledge of facts that might confirm the probable falsity of [the source's] charges."

Gertz v. Welch (1974)

Elmer Gertz, well-known Chicago attorney, sues American Opinion magazine published by John Birch Society for calling him a communist who deliberately framed a cop for murder. Supreme Court holds that even though Gertz was in public eye he is not a public figure.

Supreme Court defines two kinds of public figures - "all-purpose" public figures who "occupy positions of such pervasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes," and "limited-purpose" public figures who voluntarily injected themselves into public controversies in order to resolve the issue or "engaged the public's attention in an effort to influence" the outcome of an issue. Court also holds that actual malice must be proven by "clear and convincing evidence" and declares that it is up to states to set fault standards for libel suits by non-public figures.

Hutchinson v. Proxmire
(1979)

With a "Golden Fleece Award," Sen. William Proxmire criticizes government scientist Ronald Hutchinson's research on monkey behavior as example of wasteful government spending. Proxmire's derogatory statements published in Senate speech, and in press release, constituent newsletter and nationally televised talk show. In Hutchinson's suit for defamation, lower court declares him a public figure and says Sen. Proxmire is protected from libel suits by the Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution. Supreme Court reverses.

While speeches by members of Congress are immune from suit, their newsletters and press releases are not because neither is "essential to the deliberations of the Senate" and neither was part of the deliberative process... Hutchinson was not a public figure or public official because he did not thrust himself or his views into public controversy engendered by Sen. Proxmire's criticism of his research, did not assume any role of public prominence in the broad question of concern about federal spending, and "did not have the regular and continuing access to the media that is one of the accouterments of having become a public figure."

Masson v. New Yorker Magazine (1991)

Freudian disciple Jeffrey Masson sues New Yorker writer Janet Malcolm for falsely quoting him (eg. calling himself "the greatest analyst who ever lived.") Masson claims Malcolm deliberately changed quotes to represent him inaccurately as egotistical and dishonest. Supreme Court finds that article was not published with knowledge of falsity.

Majority says that quoted material need not be an exact verbatim record of what a speaker said: "We conclude that a deliberate alteration of the words...does not equate with knowledge of falsity...unless the alteration results in a material change in the meaning conveyed by the statement."

Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps
(1986)

The Philadelphia Inquirer is sued for story claiming that Thrifty chain, which sells beer, soft drinks and snacks used its criminal connections to influence Pennsylvania liquor control board. State law requires plaintiff to prove negligence in the reporting but does not require the plaintiff to prove the report to be false. It puts the burden on the press to prove its reportage to be accurate. The Supreme Court reverses.

Supreme Court holds that in order to ensure that truthful speech is not deterred, public officials, public figures and private persons involved in matters of public concern must prove falsity to win a libel suit. This precedent makes libel defense easier for the press as journalists don't have to prove the truth of their reports to a jury or judge.

Herbert v. Lando (1980)

Col. Anthony Herbert sues "60 Minutes," claiming TV show falsely claimed his allegations of official cover-up of war atrocities in Vietnam were themselves intended to conceal why he had been relieved of his command. To prove actual malice by Lando, the show's producer, Herbert argues he has to know Lando's state of mind -- how he evaluated information he put in the show.

Supreme Court rejects CBS' argument that inquiry into editorial thought processes would have an "intolerable chilling effect" on editorial decision-making, at least in cases where libel plaintiffs have to show actual malice.

Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.
(1990)

Milkovich, a high school wrestling coach in Ohio, sues News-Herald for an opinion column in 1975 which accuses him of lying under oath to a panel investigating a post-match brawl. Supreme Court holds that Milkovich can recover for libel. He ultimately recovers $116,000.

Supreme Court holds that opinion statements are fully protected by the First Amendment--unless they can be proven true or false. Some subsequent appellate court opinions ignore this holding as too simplistic and look to other factors as well: Are the words more often used as statements of opinion than as factual assertions? What is the journalistic context of the remark? What is the social context of the remark?