“For too long we have turned our heads and tolerated government repression of local media in many (Middle Eastern) countries as long as their governments continued to meet our fossil fuel needs and support our foreign policy goals… Support for free and vibrant local media is the best investment we can make in building a safe, secure and democratic world.”
— David Hoffman, president of Internews Network, in testimony before the U.S. Congress.

By ALI ABBAS/EPA Thousands of Iraqi Shiite Muslims shout angry protests and parade their al-Mahdi Army, loyal to Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr in front of the quarters of coalition forces in Baghdad in March, 2004. The Shiites protested against Paul Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, and the order by the coalition to close down Al Hawza newspaper offices.

By Alissa Herbaly Coons

The end of Ramadan, celebrated with regularity and ritual for centuries in Muslim communities all over the world, was different last year in Iraq. There, it was unlike any other end of Ramadan in the history of Iraqi television because the government didn’t declare it.

For lack of a regime-endorsed show, Al-Iraqia, the Coalition-sponsored public broadcaster, covered the holiday as it happened. Some Sunnis celebrated Monday, some Shias celebrated on Tuesday and Wednesday, and everybody made the news —whether or not they picked the “right” day.

“People got very upset at us, but that was the reality,” said Al-Iraqia senior programming advisor Ala Fa’ik. “It used to be the government presented only its holiday. People used to celebrate differently, but it was not covered. This is new for the Iraqi people, to recognize each other’s holidays and to recognize that everyone has the right to celebrate in his own way.”

In this post-Saddam Iraq, one of the main challenges in establishing a free and open media is a lack of understanding among Iraqi journalists, politicians and ordinary citizens of the media’s role in democracy. Democracy is itself a foreign concept in a nation emerging from decades of dictatorship. As the Coalition Provisional Authority and Iraqi Governing Council prepare the way for a transitional Iraqi government and a democratic constitution, the importance of developing an honest and effective indigenous media is paramount. The successes of democracy and independent media in Iraq are symbiotic; and everyone concerned with rebuilding Iraq, native or not, bears some responsibility for whatever the outcome of this experiment will be.

Eleven days after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the first new Iraqi newspaper hit the chaotic streets of Baghdad, starting a rush of as many as 200 magazines and papers throughout the country, which saturated the market with religious, political, economic, cultural and tabloid news. Anyone with an opinion and money can and will speak out, particularly politicians and religious leaders lobbying for influence in the new Iraq. Most of these new voices have either no professional media training, or are recent converts from the now defunct Ministry of Information.

Radio and television stations have been slower to emerge, due to a lack of broadcast equipment and infrastructure and the fact that the governmental organization needed to take place before frequencies could be allocated.

Since 1964 the University of Baghdad Faculty of Mass Communications has been producing journalists trained in media practices based on Soviet propaganda methods. Hussein’s regime maintained tight control of information inside Iraq, banning satellites, planting intelligence agents throughout the media, and quickly eliminating dissidents.

Journalist Nada Shawqat, quoted by British correspondent Robert Fisk in London’s Independent, explained that under Saddam she had some freedom to write until his sons took an interest in the press 13 years ago. “Then we started getting instructions every day from the minister of information, telling us what to write and what not to write.”

“The regime presented only one point of view, the journalist’s job was to glorify the leader,” said returned exile Fa’ik in a Dec. 3 phone interview from Baghdad. “Freedom of journalism? We don’t have journalists trained to handle that concept and to practice that with responsibility.”

In early June 2003, 28 years after he left his hometown to study directing in the United States, Fa’ik returned to war-torn Baghdad to contribute to his country’s future.

“A cornerstone for democracy is to have a free and independent media. My main mission, why I came to Iraq, is to build this,” he said.

Out of the burgeoning print media, some publications have folded for commercial and competitive reasons. Many continue to turn no profit, but the publishers are more concerned with spreading their messages than making money. Advertising revenues are slow to emerge in Iraq’s shaky new economy.

Azzaman, or “Time” in Arabic, started in London in 1996, is one of the most popular Iraqi papers. Founded by exiled Iraqi diplomat and aspiring politician Saad al-Bazzaz, one-time editor of the Baathist paper, Al-Jumuria, the paper leads the Iraqi press in size and credibility, though foreign critics note that articles contain pro-invasion word substitutions—”coalition” instead of “occupation”—and that articles often come across as anti-Shia.

Shawqat, who worked for Al-Jumuria until the last day of the war, is now Azzaman’s editorial supervisor in Baghdad.

“We have a circulation of 50,000 in Baghdad, another 15,000 in Basra, each edition carrying 12 pages of foreign and Arab news and eight of local news.” Fisk quotes her as saying. “It’s good to feel like a real journalist at last.”

George Papagiannis of the Internews Network, a U.S.-based media development NGO, spent much of August 2003 in Iraq interacting with journalists, officials and other Iraqis to promote cooperation for the Iraqi media law project he manages.

“There is a lack of understanding what independent media is all about, and in the case of Iraq, there is a lack of professionalism,” Papagiannis said in a November 2003 telephone interview, citing examples of stories run in newspapers based purely on rumors, for example, that the CPA put AIDS in the drinking water supply. “You do get a lot of crap.”

“After any altercation…the second casualty is the truth,” he said, describing Iraqi journalists’ inability or reluctance to portray more than one side of a story, verify questionable statements, or to describe important contexts behind difficult or deadly events.

Despite the profusion of new publications on the market, according to a State Department survey released in October 2003, only 5 percent of Iraqis get their news from the papers, while television news garners the primary attention of 88 percent of the population.

Given the deep reach of television into Iraqi society, the failure of the CPA to use television to effectively communicate with the Iraqi people has been widely criticized. Al-Iraqia, a part of the CPA’s Iraqi Media Network, is struggling to find its place in Iraq. Its mediocre programming has played the seemingly contradictory roles of promoting excellence in independent broadcasting and providing an information service to the CPA, something that has proved difficult for the Iraqi public, and media development organizations, to fathom.

The IMN lacks infrastructure and equipment. Studios are cramped, storage space is extremely limited, and most equipment dates back to 1975. As of November 2003, there were only eight news cameras, and reporters outside of Baghdad have to physically carry their footage back to the central studio, which severely limits news coverage. IMN officials cited in the joint independent assessment of Iraqi media needs estimated that of those journalists hired, 90 percent are former employees of the Ministry of Information.

Several leaders involved with the network’s conception have since left or been replaced, complaining of a lack of editorial independence and insufficient funding that made the network unable to compete with Arab satellite stations.

The popularity of once-banned satellite dishes has soared as Iraqis search out international news and entertainment. About 33 percent reported having access to a satellite dish, in the State Department survey. The 59 percent of Iraqis with only local television access reported depending on IMN for news about their country. Of Iraqis with satellite access, 37 percent get their news from pan-Arab station Al-Arabia, 26 percent from Qatar-based Al-Jazeera, and 12 percent from IMN.

The Pentagon subcontractor that launched IMN, Science Applications International Corp., had no previous media experience, and withdrew from Iraq at the end of its initial contract amid heavy criticism for its failure to deliver a quality news network.

The Coalition’s goal for the network, according to the IMN development contract for 2004, is for it to set the example as a “world class” media organization that will “lead all mass media in providing comprehensive, accurate, fair, and balanced news and public affairs to the Iraqi people.”

The Florida-based, broadcast technology-savvy Harris Corporation, along with media organizations Al Fouarez of Kuwait and the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International will be responsible for the near future of the IMN. Their job, in the next year (with two six-month extensions possible) is to train journalists, improve technology and turn the IMN into a self-supporting broadcaster.

Fa’ik, who recognizes the wide gap between Al-Iraqia’s lofty goals and actual production, is still dedicated. “In reality, nobody’s telling us what to say, what not to say,” he said. “If it is propaganda, I will resign.”

Fa’ik is intent on proving Al-Iraqia’s objectivity through practice and the continued training of IMN journalists. He returns to the Ramadan programming to support his case.

“We recorded and we broadcast in its entirety the prayer and the sermons of the Sunni and Shias,” Fa’ik said. “One of the Sunni called the violence and terrorist attacks a ‘resistance’ and the Americans are ‘occupying’ forces.”

There was an electrical failure in the middle of the Sunni speech, which would have been a convenient excuse for Fa’ik to edit the event and remove the content he didn’t like. But there was one camera operating on battery, so Fa’ik broadcast the whole message. Nobody at the IMN asked him why or questioned his decision. Some Sunnis called and asked Fa’ik why he left the speech in.

Until the legal and technical infrastructure needed for indigenous media to dominate the Iraqi market exists, Al-Iraqia, with all of its shortcomings, is the best station in Iraq.

To guide Iraq’s emerging media through the transition, Order 14, a three-page law Bremer signed June 10, 2003, emphasizes the responsibilities that come with the freedoms now available in Iraq. Based on legislation that has guided Kosovo during its transition to democracy, Order 14 welcomes “the emergence of a free and independent media in Iraq,” but also gives Bremer sole authority to shut down media outlets he deems in violation of the code.

The essence of the law is to publish nothing that incites people to violence against any religious, ethnic, or occupation force, or advocates the return of the Ba’ath Party. Bremer came under criticism within the CPA and military and from numerous media freedom advocacy groups for claiming this level of censorship, which seems to be in direct conflict with the democratic ideas of freedom that the U.S. occupation is supposed to foster, and has since emphasized his desire to promote open media.

By Ammar Awad / REUTERS Arabic satellite news channel Al Arabiya correspondent Ali Khatib and cameraman Ali Abdulaziz arrive at a Baghdad hospital in March, 2004 after a shooting incident with U.S. forces. Khatib was wounded in the conflict and Abdulaziz died later in the hospital.

Since September 2003, the Iraqi Governing Council has repeatedly suspended Al-Arabia and Al-Jazeera from covering council meetings or working in Iraq for broadcasting what it perceived to be biased or violence-provoking material. The reaction to censor news it can’t control stems from the Governing Council members’ distrust of independent media, which was modeled for them under the old regime, and the CPA’s sporadic censorship of Iraqi papers. The two stations have been frequently criticized by U.S. and British government officials for their anti-Coalition slant.

David Denehy, the deputy directory of the CPA’s Office of Democracy and Governance shared his opinion in a December 2003 e-mail.

“While I certainly do not support media censorship, Al-Arabia and other gulf-based media outlets have for some time been fanning the flames of conflict,” he said.

In his job as a political transition advisor to Bremer, Denehy has worked with focus groups of Iraqi professionals, most of whom watch Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabia, but not without skepticism.

“The problem is that there is nothing to compete with these powerhouses, so most [Iraqi’s] with dishes or access to satellite TV watch these stations,” Denehy said.

In early 2004, the U.S. broadcasting Board of Governors, with congressional funding, launched Al-Hurra, “the free one,” an Arabic satellite news station produced in suburban Washington D.C., to provide U.S.-friendly news content to compete with other Arabic stations. It is still too early to gauge its impact, but initial reviews called it arrogant and irrelevant.

Internews’ U.S.A.I.D. and Greek government-backed conference for Iraqi media law, held June 1-3, 2003, in Greece, put the final touches on a legal draft drawn up by a working group of media law experts and journalists. The preface to this document describes a legal framework “rooted in the vision of a social and political future that our people deserve and aspire to: a free, independent and united Iraq, where government is the servant of the people and accountable to them; where there is peace, justice, and the rule of law; and where people can build a modern society in accordance with principles of democracy, international law, tolerance and human rights.”

Of the 75 conference participants from 15 countries, 60 percent were Arab (mostly exiled Iraqis). Attendees strongly supported the framework, but there was a shortage of non-exile Iraqis personally familiar with the situation in Iraq.

“It was an interesting, valuable academic exercise, but as a service to the Iraqi media, at best it was a pseudo-democratic process,” said participant and Index on Censorship Assistant Editor Rohan Jayasekera in an e-mail. “This is a job for the Iraqi people, not international media NGOs.”

The media law draft also calls for an independent media commission to govern and regulate the media, where anyone with a media-related complaint (CPA, media or individual) could get an open hearing and verdict. British journalist Simon Haselock, who heads a media law advisory section inside the CPA, has been working to form an interim media commission out of various Iraqi ministries. The Governing Council has also weighed in on the process, and in January 2004, the Council approved legislation to create an Iraqi media supervisory body, a system of self-regulation for the press, and a resolution to turn IMN into a bonafide public broadcaster. The successful implementation of these ideas and the indigenous Iraqi effort they empower would form the basis Iraqi society needs to move forward into order.

Denehy explained that there is some basic agreement on strategic issues of the media market and press freedoms between the media interests in Iraq, but for the first several months of reconstruction, there had not been much coordination among them.

Relationships between the CPA and journalist unions have been strained, he said, and the CPA is discussing bringing in international donors to build new media organizations.

“My own opinion is that the old ones are too plagued with old thinking and the legacy of the past to be rebuilt,” Denehy said. “But unions will only exist if we are able to instill journalistic integrity and ethics. There are organizations and movements afoot to help build these principles. If they will succeed, it will in large part be due to the political landscape that develops. “

The numerous independent press advocacy groups with interests in Iraq include the BBC World Trust, Index on Censorship, and Institute for War and Peace Reporting.

Internews’ efforts to promote the media law project to journalists and leaders in Iraq were put on hold when the organization pulled out of Iraq in August 2003, citing increasing security risks, but also to wait for a broader review of U.S. media development policy in Iraq. As long as media training projects are paid for by the Defense Department, Internews, whose international media development projects are usually funded by the State Dept. through U.S.A.I.D., will not bid, Papagiannis said.

Cooperation between Defense and State departments has been strained throughout operations in Iraq.

George Packer, in his “War after the War” article in the Nov. 24 New Yorker, explained that Donald Rumsfeld’s disagreement with Colin Powell over foreign policy kept the two organizations from coordinating reconstruction planning efforts. The State Department’s lengthy Future of Iraq Project manual has gathered dust while Pentagon officials with minimal reconstruction experience planned the Defense Department’s approach to managing Iraq. The Defense team, led by Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense, planned for a quick hand-over to Iraqis that involved a minimum of U.S. peacekeeping troops or reconstruction. Instead, Bremer, who replaced General Jay Garner in April, took over an under-funded, understaffed mission to rebuild Iraqi civil society from scratch. Since then, the real costs of winning the battle for a democratic Iraq have become more apparent, and the U.S. government has attempted to engage other nations in the peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts.

The ongoing violence in Iraq against foreigners, security agents, journalists, and other Iraqis cooperating with the effort to rebuild the country, is daunting. But even with the assistance and security the CPA and international donors provide in Iraq, the transition to a free society will only succeed if the Iraqi people demand it for themselves.

In a Gallup survey of Baghdad residents released Nov. 11, 2003, 98 percent said the new constitution should guarantee the right to free speech. Another 86 percent supported freedom of religion; 68 percent supported freedom of assembly. Yet while Iraq’s transitional leaders decide how these freedoms will be incorporated into Iraq’s future, the threat of violence looms.

When the CPA hands control over to Iraq’s interim government in July 2004, Iraq’s success as a democracy will depend on how freely accurate information flows among its citizens. A consistently supportive and open media policy from transitional leaders will encourage the development of a competitive independent media. Ethical and practical education for journalists as well as awareness among politicians and the common people of the media’s role in a democracy are essential. Continued openness by Iraq’s new government and consistent application of liberal media law are equally important in securing the future of Iraq’s media and its democracy.

Said Fa’ik: “Building an independent media, a free independent responsible media, is not going to happen overnight. It’s going to need a tremendous support from the rest of the world who believe in these values. Iraq needs a free, independent, responsible voice because it has a wide spectrum of people from different ethnic, religious, political beliefs. We need to hear that voice to ensure a democratic Iraq.”