1. Prospective Stage
The reluctance to talk about geoengineering prior to Paul Crutzen’s landmark article in 2006 suggests that some ethical issues arise before any work on the technology has even begun. These concerns focus on possible implications of even talking seriously about intentionally engineering the climate. If these concerns are decisive, they might in some cases preclude the possibility of beginning geoengineering at all. In other cases, they provide warnings about how the geoengineering discussion should proceed.
Moral Hazard
The presence of a 'Moral hazard' suggests that certain types of insurance may promote cavalier behavior: insured individuals may expose themselves to greater risks than uninsured individuals do. Regarding geoengineering, some worry that that the prospect of a technical solution to climate change will create a 'moral hazard,' encouraging risky behavior or compromising mitigation and adaptation efforts. The exact impact that the prospect of geoengineering will have on behavior is, of course, uncertain. But the limited economic, institutional, and political resources available to address climate change make it reasonable to suggest that serious talk about geoengineering could divert energy and resources from mitigation measures.
The moral hazard warning, however, turns out to be a little more complex than it appears. Ben Hale is concerned that it gives little guidance in geoengineering conversations: simply calling something a moral hazard does not actually establish a wrong unless it can be shown that the behavior the hazard precipitates is itself morally problematic. Additionally, talk of geoengineering might, in fact, have the opposite effect and encourage people to do more to mitigate climate change in order to avoid going down the risky path of geoengineering.
Reading:
Crutzen, P. J. (2006). Albedo enhancement by stratospheric sulfur injections: A contribution to resolve a policy dilemma? Climatic Change, 77(3–4), 211–220.
Hale, B. (2012). The world that would have been: Moral hazard arguments against geoengineering. In C. J. Preston (Ed.), Engineering the Climate: The Ethics of Solar Radiation Management (pp. 113-131). Lanham, MD: Lexington Press.
Lin, A. (2012). Does geoengineering present a moral hazard? Ecology Law Quarterly (in press).
Moral Corruption
Stephen Gardiner has argued that anthropogenic climate change poses a 'perfect moral storm': its causes are both spatially and temporally removed from its effects, and we lack the theoretical and institutional resources we need to deal with it. In this perfect storm, we are prone to distorted and corrupt moral reasoning. Gardiner defines moral corruption as "illegitimate taking advantage of a position of superior power for the sake of personal gain" (Gardiner, 2011, p. 304). In a social and political context in which we have failed to do anything effectual about climate change for the last 20 years, Gardiner worries that we may corruptly endorse a geoengineering research program as an excuse to continue doing nothing about emissions and adaptation. For Gardiner, this pattern of neglect would embark us upon to a risky and untested technological path with potentially damaging effects on future persons and the poor. Thinking of geoengineering as an adequate alternative to emissions reductions may be, according to Gardiner, culpable self-deception and a 'blighting' evil for the considerable burdens it would impose on posterity.
Reading:
Gardiner, S. (2011). A perfect moral storm: The ethical tragedy of climate change. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, P. T. (2012). Domination and the ethics of solar radiation management. In C. J. Preston (Ed.), Engineering the Climate: The Ethics of Solar Radiation Management (pp. 43-61). Lanham, MD: Lexington Press.
Hubris
The prospect of geoengineering demonstrates what some consider to be a hubristic attitude about the role of humans in the world. Over the last 40 years, many environmental thinkers have suggested that environmental woes are often the result of misdirected attempts to exert dominion or control over natural processes. They suggest that humans need to learn some humility and give up on the idea of re-shaping nature entirely to our own ends. Failure to do so demonstrates a culpable arrogance, or hubris. In one of the earliest articles on the ethics of geoengineering, Dale Jamieson argued that the idea of geoengineering continues this hubristic pattern of thinking.
Although the argument from hubris does not necessarily rule geoengineering out, it fits with a common tendency in environmental ethics to think that earth's historical biogeochemical processes possess some moral significance in themselves (Rolston, 1988). Christopher Preston has suggested that the value of these historical biogeochemical processes might create a ‘presumptive argument’ against geoengineering (even if the presumption may ultimately be overturned). Still, it places a heavy burden of proof on those who would advocate interference in these processes with geoengineering when other options are still on the table.
Reading:
Jamieson, D. (1996). Ethics and intentional climate change. Climatic Change, 33(3), 323–336.
Rolston III, H. (1988) Environmental ethics: Duties to and values in the natural world. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Preston, C. J. (2011). Re-thinking the unthinkable: environmental ethics and the presumptive argument against geoengineering. Environmental Values, 20(4), 457–479.
Technological Fix
Alvin Weinberg coined the term 'technological fix,' or 'techno-fix,' to describe the strategy of attempting to fix a difficult social or behavioral problem with an engineering solution. A technological fix is attractive in many cases because it often appears simpler, quicker, and less demanding than solving the problem by making the difficult social transformations that might otherwise be required. Geoengineering might be an example of such a technological fix. Without the assistance of atmosphere-altering technology, combating climate change would demand massive (and perhaps unachievable) social and behavioral change.
The moral status of the technological fix is ambiguous. People tend to like technological fixes because they can be easier than behavioral changes. On the other hand, environmental thinkers often want a change in values and actions rather than simply the deployment of a technology that allows the continuation of pernicious behaviors. For example, many environmentalists worry that a geoengineering solution would permit continuing high levels of consumption, waste, and greenhouse gas emissions. Technological fixes may also inadvertently create new problems.
Are technological fixes really a problematic way to address climate change? In the case of solar radiation management (SRM), the inadequacy of the techno-fix is immediately evident because SRM does nothing to solve the problem of continuing ocean acidification and because SRM poses the threat of very rapid warming should it have to be suddenly withdrawn. By contrast, with a carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technology such as direct air capture or afforestation, we might be able to slow the increase in greenhouse gas concentrations, making it harder to argue against the consumption of carbon-intensive fuels. This kind of fix may be considered less problematic.
Reading:
Weinberg, A. (1967). Reflections on Big Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
LeCain T. (2004). When everybody wins does the environment lose? The environmental techno-fix in twentieth-century mining. In L. Rosner (Ed.), The Technological Fix: How People Use Technology to Create and Solve Social Problems (pp. 137–153). New York, NY: Routledge.
Scott, D. (2012). Insurance policy or technological fix? The ethical implications of framing solar radiation management. In C. J. Preston (Ed.), Engineering the Climate: The Ethics of Solar Radiation Management (pp. 151-168). Lanham, MD: Lexington Press.
Borgmann, A. (2012). The setting of the scene: technological fixes and the design of the good life. In C. J. Preston (Ed.), Engineering the Climate: The Ethics of Solar Radiation Management (pp. 189-200). Lanham, MD: Lexington Press.