II. Preventing Terrorism and Extremism in the Horn of Africa

"The greatest shortcoming of the international community today is its failure to prevent conflict and maintain global security."[204]

Introduction

The Horn of Africa is a diverse region with a growing trend of terrorist and violent extremist activity.[205] The term "Horn of Africa" refers to Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia, along with the accompanying coastline.[206] While the United Nations (UN) has not endorsed a definitive definition of terrorism, a widely accepted meaning of the word is the use and/or threat of use of violence against civilians for the purposes of achieving political, ideological, economic, and/or social goals.[207] The League of Nations *Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism* in 1937 stated that, "acts of terrorism means criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public."[208] The Security Council has categorized terrorism as one of the most significant threats to international peace and security.[209] Another threat that has been recognized by the Security Council as a factor leading to terrorism, is violent extremism.[210] Extremism is the belief in extreme ideologies, advocating for violence and lack of tolerance, and can translate to terrorism if an individual acts on those beliefs.[211]

A continuing case of rising terrorist and violent extremist activity in the region is in Somalia.[212] Al-Shabaab, a radical Islamic terrorist group active since 2006, is the largest and most lethal terrorist organization in the region.[213] With areas of operation in Somalia and northern Kenya, Al-Shabaab engages in open attacks against civilians, youth radicalization, and encouragement of extremist ideology.[214] Al-Shabaab controls large swathes of Somalia, enabling it to launch attacks in Kenya and Ethiopia, resulting in the spread of terrorism and regional insecurity.[215] Piracy, economic stagnation, and vast human rights violations have led to Somalia being labeled as a failed state.[216] The Security Council has taken a strong stand against terrorism and violent extremism in the Horn of Africa through, among other areas of work, dispatching the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) to assist the African Union (AU) in security, peacebuilding, and humanitarian issues.[217] Through its work with the Somali government and civil society organizations (CSOs), like the Centre for Peace Initiative and Development, and the Coalition for Grass Roots and Women Organization, UNSOM forces are helping gain the trust of the local population.[218] Working together with the Somali government to ensure the security apparatus of the country, provide humanitarian aid, and help to build infrastructure, is paramount to preventing terrorism and violent extremism in the Horn of Africa.[219] UNSOM, the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), along with military campaigns by the United States, Ethiopia, and most recently Kenya, have led to Al-Shabaab retreating and subsequently launching guerilla warfare tactics.[220] A provisional government in Somalia was established with the aim of strengthening stability and addressing regional terrorism and violent extremism.[221] The lack of effective regional collaboration to combat terrorism and its root causes has resulted in deterioration of security, the rise of terrorist and extremist groups, and the increased

---

[204] UN DPI, *In opinion piece, Secretary-General Antonio Guterres shares new vision for UN*, 2017.
[205] Council on Foreign Relations, *Global Conflict Tracker: Al-Shabab in Somalia*, 2017.
[206] Korybko, *Hybrid Wars in the Horn of Africa: Ethiopia-Eritrea, "Greater Somalia"*, 2016.
[207] UN DPI, *Terrorism*, 2017.
[208] League of Nations, *Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism*, 1937, p. 6, article 1.2.
[209] UN DPI, *UN Chief, Security Council strongly condemn terrorist attack on Manchester concert*, 2017.
[210] UN General Assembly, *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism: Report of the Secretary-General (A/70/674)*, 2015, pp. 1-4.
[211] Ibid.
[212] Council on Foreign Relations, *Global Conflict Tracker: Al-Shabab in Somalia*, 2017.
[213] Human Rights Watch, *Somalia: Events of 2015*, 2015.
[214] Ibid.
[215] Council on Foreign Relations, *Global Conflict Tracker: Al-Shabab in Somalia*, 2017.
[216] *Somalia - Most-failed state: Twenty-five years of chaos in the Horn of Africa*, The Economist, 2016.
[217] UN CTITF, *UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, 2016.
[218] UN Security Council, *Somalia (S/RES/2102 (2013))*, 2013.
[219] Ibid.
[220] Council on Foreign Relations, *Global Conflict Tracker: Al-Shabab in Somalia*, 2017.
[221] AMISOM, *AMISOM Mandate*, 2017.

radicalization of young people.[222] Border safety continues to deteriorate in the region, leading to greater militarization of Member States in the Horn of Africa.[223] This increase in military presence has created a security dilemma in a region where terrorism and violent extremism continue to pose a threat.[224] Focusing on the causes of instability, like youth radicalization, underdevelopment, and the financing of terrorist groups, will enable the international community to successfully prevent further developments in terrorist activities and extremism in the Horn of Africa.[225] The overall stability of the region remains a concern for the international community and will require further steps to be taken to mitigate impending risks.[226]

International and Regional Framework

As a response to the rise in terrorist activity around the world, *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy* (GCTS) was adopted by consensus in the UN General Assembly in 2006 and is subject to review every two years.[227] The GCTS calls for the strengthening of Member States' national capacities to successfully combat terrorist groups.[228] Enhancing Member States' capabilities to monitor, track, apprehend, and prosecute individuals and financiers of terrorist groups results in greater internal and, in turn, regional and global security.[229] The GCTS also created a global database to track terrorism around the world, compiling information from national police agencies on known terrorist groups, individuals, and activities.[230] The database allows Member States to conduct criminal investigations and police work more efficiently, while disrupting terrorist activities within their territory.[231] Lastly, the GCTS places the respect for human rights and the rule of law at the crux for the fight against terrorism.[232] The fifth review of the GCTS in 2016 resulted in General Assembly resolution 70/291, which stressed the need for the UN and government agencies to adapt to new developments and threats of international terrorism, such as the widespread use of social media as a propaganda disseminator and homegrown/lone-wolf acts of terror.[233]

The international community has also taken a number of steps to address the financial structures that allow for enduring terrorist activity. [234] The *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism* (1999) set forth a framework for combatting the financing of terrorism through Member States collaboration, and by tracking suspicious financial transactions.[235] Likewise, UN Security Council resolutions 1456 (2003) and 2178 (2014) on suppressing terrorism outlined the need to combat financial contributions through targeted sanctions, the freezing of accounts, and the active interception of movement between borders.[236] In 2014, the Security Council adopted resolution 2178 on "Countering Violent Extremism" (CVE).[237] This resolution called for Member States to prevent the movement of terrorists, to prosecute cases dealing with forgeries of travel documents, and to establish greater international cooperation between national security agencies focusing on transnational terrorism.[238] It draws special attention to the financing of international terrorism and calls for the strengthening criminal offense laws.[239]

---

[222] Ploch et al., *Piracy off the Horn of Africa*, 2011, pp. 1-5.
[223] *Ethiopia and Eritrea blame each other for border clash*, BBC, 2016.
[224] Ibid.
[225] Ploch et al., *Piracy off the Horn of Africa*, 2011, pp. 1-5.
[226] UN Security Council, *Somalia (S/RES/2102 (2013))*, 2013.
[227] UN General Assembly, *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288)*, 2006.
[228] Ibid.
[229] UN CTITF, *UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, 2016.
[230] Ibid.
[231] Ibid.
[232] UN General Assembly, *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288)*, 2006.
[233] UN General Assembly, *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Review (A/RES/70/291)*, 2016.
[234] UN General Assembly, *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (A/RES/54/109)*, 1999; UN Security Council, *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/2178)*, 2014.
[235] UN General Assembly, *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (A/RES/54/109)*, 1999.
[236] UN Security Council, *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/2178)*, 2014; UN Security Council, *High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism (S/RES/1456 (2003))*, 2003.
[237] UN Security Council, *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/2178 (2014))*, 2014, pp. 4-8.
[238] Ibid.
[239] Ibid.

During the Geneva Conference in 2015, Member States adopted the *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism*.[240] The Plan of Action stated that violent extremism is conducive to terrorist activity, and noted conditions that can lead to radicalization, such as economic marginalization, lack of opportunities and resources for economic development, and political repression.[241] The Plan of Action also recognized the role of poor governance in fostering conditions conducive to terrorism; through repressive policies and practices, the exclusion of specific groups from governance, and direct state action against certain communities.[242] It stressed the need for a more comprehensive security-based approach, involving the military and intelligence apparatuses of Member States, to address violent extremism and combat terrorism.[243] The Plan of Action advocates for a global framework for preventing violent extremism, encouraging Member States to adopt national plans of action to implement anti-violent extremism policies at the local level, involving government actors, law enforcement, and civil society.[244] The national plans of action are highly encouraged to include provisions for regional security cooperation in order to track individuals suspected of terrorist activity.[245] The Plan of Action also includes provisions that call for direct action of the international community.[246] It further calls for the engagement of religious leaders and funding for programs that are aimed at de-radicalization of individuals that were engaged in terrorist and/or violent extremist activities.[247] Lastly, the Plan of Action lists the strengthening of communications, greater monitoring of social media activities, respect for the rule of law, gender equality, and the development of economic opportunity as prime concerns in order to combat of international terrorism and violent extremism.[248]

Role of the International System

The international community has taken multiple steps to prevent terrorism and violent extremism in the Horn of Africa.[249] General Assembly resolution 51/210 on "Measures to Eliminate Internal Terrorism" (1997) created the Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism, a body of 35 Member States focused on the implementation of the GCTS.[250] The Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism serves to complement the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), created in Security Council resolution 1373 (2001).[251] The CTC is a subsidiary body of the Security Council, and is tasked with identifying major developments in international terrorism and recommending steps to combat it.[252] The UN CVE strategy calls for the Counter-Terrorism Committee to identify any gaps in CVE efforts and report regularly on them to the Security Council.[253] Finally, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) takes a multi-faceted approach to fighting terrorism, by coordinating the efforts of 37 agencies within the UN system and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL).[254]

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
Noting the proliferation of terrorism and violent extremism in the Horn of Africa, the African Union established AMISOM in February of 2007.[255] AMISOM is a peacekeeping mission composed of military, police, and civilian components.[256] The main objective of AMISOM is the reduction of the threat of the terrorist group Al-Shabaab, assisting Somali Security Forces, and ensuring that the government of Somalia and UN personnel can continue their vital functions through the creation of a secure context.[257] The AMISOM force is composed of 22,126 uniformed

---

[240] UN General Assembly, *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism: Report of the Secretary-General (A/70/674)*, 2015, p. 1.
[241] Ibid., pp. 1-4.
[242] Ibid., pp. 4-10.
[243] Ibid., pp. 10-22.
[244] Ibid.
[245] Ibid.
[246] Ibid.
[247] Ibid.
[248] Ibid.
[249] UN Security Council, *Counter-Terrorism Committee: Mandate*, 2017.
[250] UN General Assembly, *Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (A/RES/51/210)*, 1997.
[251] UN Security Council, *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/1373(2001))*, 2001.
[252] UN Security Council, *Counter-Terrorism Committee: Mandate*, 2017.
[253] UN Security Council, *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/2178(2014))*, 2014, pp. 4-8.
[254] UN CTITF, *About the Task Force*; UN CTITF, *Entities*.
[255] AMISOM, *AMISOM Mandate*, 2017.
[256] Ibid.
[257] Ibid.

personal, split into military and police units.[258] The military component's goal is to stabilize Somalia in order to allow the access of humanitarian assistance into the country.[259] While the AMISOM forces are credited with destabilizing Al-Shabaab in their strongholds, a recent report by Human Rights Watch detailed wide sexual exploitation and abuse by AU forces in Somalia.[260] Incoming AMISOM units are now required to undergo Sexual and Gender-Based Violence training and greater attention has been reserved in dispatching Gender Units composed of female soldiers, as a necessary way to instill trust within communities and collaborate on peacebuilding.[261]

United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)
In support of AMISOM, in 2013 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 2102, formally establishing UNSOM.[262] UNSOM is mandated to assist the Somali government with policy development, peacebuilding, and effective governance.[263] The core functions of UNSOM include: assistance in governance, security sector reform, and application of the rule of law.[264] UNSOM police units work together with Somali police to reclaim and stabilize neighborhoods that were formerly controlled by extremist groups.[265] A notable achievement of UNSOM is working with the Somali government to create the National Programme for the Treatment and Handling of Disengaged Combatants in Somalia, a joint effort to help former Al-Shabaab members reintegrate into society, while working to understand the factors and circumstances that continue to lead Somali youth to join extremist organizations.[266]

Factors Leading to a Rise of Terrorism and Violent Extremism

Youth Radicalization
The Horn of Africa is a region with an increasing rate of youth radicalization.[267] According to the Institute for Security Studies, 40% of all recruits of Al-Shabaab are children or young adults, between the ages of 15-19 years.[268] The name Al-Shabaab translates to "The Youth," and it incentivizes young people to join the organization by providing structure and a sense of purpose.[269] The factors that lead to youth radicalization include a lack of economic opportunities in the region, underdevelopment, natural calamities, and ongoing civil strife.[270] The region has experienced an ongoing conflict since the Border War between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1988.[271] The conflict resulted in the deaths of over 80,000 people with continual violence in border areas.[272] The resulting humanitarian situation has further deteriorated due to a continual drought in Somalia, the failure of crops, and the rise of internally displaced persons (IDPs) as a result of terrorist violence.[273] Through the combination of these factors, the number of people in Somalia in need of humanitarian assistance has risen to 6.7 million.[274] A large component of those internally displaced people are youth under 25 years of age, with limited education, a lack of viable financial and economic opportunities, and continual government repression.[275]

One of the most urgent tasks of the international community is to ensure the safety of young men and women in this region.[276] Strengthening UN forces active in the Horn of Africa will enable greater capability and protection for communities in the region, effectively safeguarding youth who are increasingly susceptible to terrorist

---

[258] Council on Foreign Relations, *Global Conflict Tracker: Al-Shabab in Somalia*, 2017.
[259] AMISOM, *AMISOM Military Component*, 2017.
[260] Human Rights Watch, *"The Power These Men Have Over Us"; Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by African Union Forces in Somalia*, 2014.
[261] AMISOM, *AMISOM soldiers undergo Sexual and Gender Based Violence Training in Baidoa*, 2017.
[262] UN Security Council, *Somalia (S/RES/2102 (2013))*, 2013.
[263] Ibid.
[264] Ibid.; UN Security Council, *The situation in Somalia*, 2017.
[265] UNSOM, *Police Section*, 2017.
[266] UNSOM, *Voices of Al-Shabaab: Understanding former combatants from the Baidoa Reintegration Center*, 2016.
[267] Arigatou International, *GNRC Annual Report 2016/2017*, 2017, pp. 16-30.
[268] Ibid.
[269] Ali, *Radicalization Process in the Horn of Africa – Phrases and Relevant Factors*, 2017.
[270] Cachalia et al., *The Dynamics of Youth Radicalization in Africa*, 2016.
[271] *Ethiopia and Eritrea blame each other for border clash*, BBC, 2016.
[272] Ibid.
[273] Burke, *Al-Shabaab militants ban starving Somalis from accessing aid*, 2017.
[274] Ibid.
[275] Ali, *Radicalization Process in the Horn of Africa – Phrases and Relevant Factors*, 2017.
[276] UN Security Council, *Somalia (S/RES/2102 (2013))*, 2013.

recruitment.[277] Greater educational and economic opportunities in the Horn of Africa are needed in order to empower young people to reject extremist ideology.[278] Terrorist and extremist organizations depend on recruiting disenfranchised young people, who lack better options in their home countries.[279] Ensuring regional trade, increasing the safety and resilience of communities, and empowering civil society, are vital components in the effort to empower youth in the Horn of Africa.[280] Several aspects have proven fruitful in this endeavor, including providing aid, ensuring security, and helping to set the foundation for providing opportunities to young men and women.[281] Ensuring female representation in government and peacebuilding initiatives will also lead to better societal involvement.[282]

Financing of Terrorism
The financing of terrorist organizations includes a multitude of components that enable these groups to recruit and operate, such as large money transfers and the trading of natural resources to fund terrorist activities.[283] Untracked money transfers from anonymous individuals enables radical organizations to garner the resources necessary to launch terrorist attacks.[284] The availability of financial capital further increases the active recruitment of people from impoverished communities.[285] Al-Qaida and ISIL affiliates are reported in many Member States in the Horn of Africa as a direct result of untracked monetary flows.[286] Radical Islamist ideology has also spread through the financing of madrassas and other religious schools by Saudi Arabia, and the proliferation of Wahhabi-trained imams in those institutions.[287] Young children in the region that are educated in these madrassas are exposed to an extreme type of Islam, characterized by the rejection of democratic institutions and the promotion of extreme ideas.[288]

Some of the financial resources that contributed to the arming of Al-Shabaab militants come as a direct result of piracy.[289] Somali pirates operating from Puntland prey on international shipping vessels whose cargoes bring revenue to finance terrorist organizations.[290] This increase of piracy in the region led the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to issue the *Djibouti Code of Conduct* in 2015, to ensure mutual cooperation for security off the coast of East Africa.[291] It is important to consider piracy as a grave threat, because it allows for the transfer of money and weapons that arm terrorist and extremist factions.[292] While the *Djibouti Code of Conduct* is extensive in its scope, the international community must ensure its effective implementation in the Horn of Africa.[293]

Case Study: Somalia

Somalia has not had a functional national government for the past twenty years.[294] The existing Somali government, assisted by 22,000 African Union troops, controls only small pockets of the state, with the vast majority of the landmass being either autonomous (Somaliland), semi-autonomous (Puntland), or in the hands of extremist groups.[295] In Mogadishu, the capital, the government controls approximately one-third of the city.[296] The remainder of the territory is controlled by Al-Shabaab, and the group has expanded its attacks to northern Kenya.[297] Al-

---

[277] AMISOM, *AMISOM Mandate*, 2017.
[278] Cachalia et al., *The Dynamics of Youth Radicalization in Africa*, 2016.
[279] Ibid.
[280] IMO, Maritime Safety Division, *Djibouti Code of Conduct*, 2015.
[281] Cachalia et al., *The Dynamics of Youth Radicalization in Africa*, 2016.
[282] Ali, *Radicalization Process in the Horn of Africa – Phrases and Relevant Factors*, 2017.
[283] UN Security Council, *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/2178 (20140)*, 2014.
[284] UN General Assembly, *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (A/RES/54/109)*, 1999.
[285] Ibid.
[286] Ibid.
[287] Ali, *Radicalization Process in the Horn of Africa – Phrases and Relevant Factors*, 2017.
[288] Cachalia et al, *The Dynamics of Youth Radicalization in Africa*, 2016.
[289] Ploch et al., *Piracy off the Horn of Africa*, 2011, p. 19.
[290] Ibid.
[291] IMO, Maritime Safety Division, *Djibouti Code of Conduct*, 2015.
[292] Ploch et al., *Piracy off the Horn of Africa*, 2011, p. 19.
[293] IMO, Maritime Safety Division, *Djibouti Code of Conduct*, 2015.
[294] *Who are Somalia's al-Shabab?*, BBC, 2016.
[295] Ibid.
[296] Dickinson, *How much turf does the Somali government really control?*, 2010.
[297] Council on Foreign Relations, *Global Conflict Tracker: Al-Shabab in Somalia*, 2017.

Shabaab consists of 7,000-9,000 fighters, with close to half being younger than 20 years of age.[298] At its height, Al-Shabaab controlled the port city of Kismayo, large parts of the capital Mogadishu, and swathes of land in south and central Somalia.[299] The land control allowed the group to expand its operations, receive funds and goods through Kismayo, and control the local population through summary executions and the banning of access to food aid for Somalis in areas under its control.[300] The continued violence has resulted in 1.1 million IDPs in Somalia.[301] In 2016, the Somali President issued a National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in response to Al-Shabaab and other terrorist organizations operating in Somalia.[302] The National Strategy outlines the role of the Somali government in combatting the root causes of radicalization in its territory.[303] It highlights factors that lead to radicalization among the Somali youth, such as underdevelopment, lack of access to education and employment opportunities, and social marginalization.[304] The core objectives of the National Strategy are to strengthen the Somali government, enhance research and communications, measure progress, and build capacity for CVE.[305]

The rise of Al-Shabaab and the ideological competition within the group between Al-Qaida and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) sympathizers has led to a further deterioration of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia.[306] Splinter groups have formed among Al-Shabaab and competing groups for the loyalty of the population, which has led to violence and open attacks against civilians.[307] As a result of Al-Shabaab's expansion into neighboring Kenya, in 2011, the government of Kenya, in collaboration with the Somali government, launched Operation Linda Nchi.[308] The operation deployed the Kenyan air force to strike Al-Shabaab bases, and ordered military units to cross into Somalia and dislodge the terrorists from their strongholds.[309] The active military approach was to stabilize the region and eradicate Al-Shabaab's sphere of influence.[310] Approximately one month after the launch of Operation Linda Nchi, Kenyan forces officially joined the AMISOM mission in Somalia, increasing African Union forces to 22,000.[311] As a result of Kenya's involvement in Somalia, Al-Shabaab began to directly target Kenya, with high-profile terrorist attacks in at a shopping mall, a university, and a military base.[312] On 19 August 2017, Kenyan Security Forces terminated the most wanted Al-Shabaab leader in Kenya.[313]

Conclusion

The Horn of Africa is a region that serves as a safe haven for terrorism and violent extremism.[314] The GCTS and the *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism* serve as core documents of the implementation of efforts of the international community to prevent these threats.[315] The international community has demonstrated its resolve in combatting terrorism and violent extremism in the Horn of Africa through the assistance missions deployed by the AU and the UN, respectively.[316] Both missions are responsible for engaging in military efforts against Al-Shabaab to prevent their expansion, and facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population.[317]

---

[298] Ibid.
[299] *Who are Somalia's al-Shabab?*, BBC, 2016.
[300] Burke, *Al-Shabaab militants ban starving Somalis from accessing aid*, 2017.
[301] Human Rights Watch, *Somalia: country Profile*, 2015.
[302] Federal Republic of Somalia, *National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism*, 2016, pp. 2-4.
[303] Ibid., pp. 7-21.
[304] Ibid.
[305] Ibid.
[306] Council on Foreign Relations, *Global Conflict Tracker: Al-Shabab in Somalia*, 2017.
[307] Anderson & McKnight, *Kenya at war: Al-Shabaab and its enemies in Eastern Africa*, 2015.
[308] Ibid.
[309] Ibid.
[310] Ibid.
[311] AMISOM, *Kenya-KDF*, 2017.
[312] Anderson & McKnight, *Kenya at war: Al-Shabaab and its enemies in Eastern Africa*, 2015.
[313] *Kenya Says Police Killed Most Wanted Al-Shabaab Commander*, AllAfrica, 2017.
[314] UN Security Council, *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 (2012): Somalia (S/RES/2102 (2013))*, 2013.
[315] UN CTITF, *UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy*, 2016.
[316] UN Security Council, *Somalia (S/RES/2102 (2013))*, 2013.
[317] Ibid.

However, through the proliferation of propaganda, economic marginalization, and underdevelopment in the Horn of Africa, young people continue to be susceptible to recruitment from terrorist and extremist organizations.[318] Moreover, the financing of terrorist groups enables greater access to weapons and resources, along with serving as a lucrative recruitment tool for marginalized, unemployed youth.[319] Somalia serves as an example of the front line in the fight to prevent and destroy terrorism and violent extremism.[320] Ensuring the safety and security of Somali communities will enable international organizations to provide humanitarian aid and resources to help revive the local economy.[321] However, terrorist and violent extremist activity remains widespread in the Horn of Africa.[322] The UN Security Council must be resolute in setting the international standard for the response to this crisis.[323]

Further Research

When researching this topic, delegates should consider the security, economic, and social situation in the Horn of Africa. Questions to consider are: How can the Security Council leverage its capabilities to meet the demands of local governments to combat terrorism and extremism? How can the international community adapt to meet new challenges, like youth radicalization, propaganda spreading, and the financing of terrorism? Does UNSOM need to be strengthened? What factors can lead to an increase in security in the region? Would the expansion of operations in the region lead to dislodging terrorists from their strongholds? How can the Security Council strengthen security cooperation in the region to fight Al-Shabaab? What is missing in the operational method of the two assistance missions? How can the Security Council prevent the current and potential future rise in terrorist and extremist groups in the Horn of Africa? What aspects of de-radicalization policies must be improved for greater effectiveness in deterring young people from joining terrorist and extremist organizations?

Annotated Bibliography

Federal Republic of Somalia. (2016). *National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism*. Retrieved 6 August 2017 from: http://www.radiomuqdisho.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/CVE-Strategy-26-August-English.pdf

> *This is a vital document for this topic, since it is the National Strategy and Plan of Action of the Somali government. Somalia was chosen as a signature case study for the topic to demonstrate the effects that the lack of an effective government, environmental calamities, economic factors, and the proliferation of terrorism and violent extremism can have on society. The National Strategy of Somalia shows the direction in which the government wishes to take the country pertaining to consolidation of power, administrative duties of the state, and ensuring that terrorist groups cease operations. It outlines the factors that the government sees as the main causes of the rise of terrorism and violent extremism, and recommends certain steps in order to ensure the safety of Somalis and security in the state.*

Human Rights Watch. (2014). *"The Power These Men Have Over Us"; Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by African Union Forces in Somalia*. Retrieved 10 August 2017 from: https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/09/08/power-these-men-have-over-us/sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-african-union-forces

> *This report allows delegates to see some of the complications of foreign intervention in Somalia. A culture of impunity and lack of accountability has allowed AMISOM forces to commit sexual assault against the people that they are mandated to protect. Targeting some of the most vulnerable groups, like displaced Somali women, erodes the trust of the local populace and threatens any progress made against terrorist groups. This report outlines the extent of sexual violence perpetrated by AMISOM forces. It is very important for delegates to consider this report because it examines some of the obstacles to foreign assistance missions, which can erode the trust of the host population, and create the next generation of extremists.*

---

[318] Hoehne, *Between Somaliland and Puntland: Marginalization, militarization and conflicting political visions*, 2015.
[319] Cachalia et al., *The Dynamics of Youth Radicalization in Africa*, 2016.
[320] Council on Foreign Relations, *Global Conflict Tracker: Al-Shabab in Somalia*, 2017.
[321] Burke, *Al-Shabaab militants ban starving Somalis from accessing aid*, 2017.
[322] Human Rights Watch, *Somalia: country Profile*, 2015.
[323] UN General Assembly, *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism: Report of the Secretary-General (A/70/674)*, 2015, p. 1.

Ploch, L. et al. (2011). *Piracy off the Horn of Africa*. United States Congressional Research Service. Retrieved 20 August 2017 from: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40528.pdf

> *This is a detailed report on piracy near the Horn of Africa, its causes, effects, and the steps taken by the international community and individual Member States to counter their influence and ensure the safety of shipping lanes. Piracy is one of the biggest issues affecting the development of the region, and the report provides a thorough account of the factors that give rise to it. A challenge presented is the overfishing practices leading local communities to turn to crime, and the political support that pirates receive from the warlords of Puntland. Given the proliferation of Somali piracy towards Mozambique and as far as India, and its relation to the financing of terrorist groups, delegates will need to take this issue into account during their deliberations in committee.*

United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia. (2016). *Voices of Al-Shabaab: Understanding former combatants from the Baidoa Reintegration Center* [Report]. Retrieved 15 August 2017 from: https://unsom.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/voices_of_al-shabaab_understanding_former_combatants_from_the_baidoa_reintegration_center.pdf

> *This report examines the factors that lead people to join extremist organizations. It focuses on former Al-Shabaab militants in Somalia and it helps to identify the various causes that lead to radicalization of an individual, such as economic marginalization and governmental repression. By understanding the root causes of radicalization, the international community can make informed decisions when combatting terrorism and violent extremism. Based on research and interviews of former members of Al-Shabaab in a Reintegration Center, the report offers a myriad of first-person accounts that shine a more personal light on members of a terrorist group and their motivations. Delegates can draw lessons from this document about the causes of radicalization, which they can apply to their proposals in committee.*

United Nations, General Assembly, Sixtieth Session. (2006). *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (A/RES/60/288)* [Resolution]. Adopted without a reference to a Main Committee. Retrieved 19 July 2017 from: http://undocs.org/A/RES/60/288

> *This is the official document outlining the counter-terrorism strategy of the UN. It reaffirms that terrorism cannot be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization, or ethnic group. While the strategy offers brief remarks on previous reports regarding the topic, it sets forth a clear Plan of Action to deal with the threat of terrorism. It unequivocally condemns terrorism in all its forms, and stresses the need to take action by offering various steps that will aid in the implementation of existing international conventions and protocols. The Plan of Action seeks to strengthen the UN's position to prevent conflicts, by actively seeking to serve as a mediator, enforce the rule of law, protect human rights, and ensure peacekeeping and peacebuilding.*

United Nations, General Assembly, Seventieth session. (2015). *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism: Report of the Secretary-General (A/70/674)*. Retrieved 16 July 2017 from: http://undocs.org/A/70/674

> *The Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism outlines the position of the UN against violent extremism, notes the factors that contribute to the rise of extremist organizations, and lays a foundation for the international community to begin to combat this trend. It draws a link between violent extremism and terrorism, and examines the military and intelligence measures that were previously adopted against Al-Qaida and ISIL as examples. It also stresses the need for a comprehensive and collaborative approach from the international community to prevent violent extremism. Delegates should use this source as a foundation for their research, as it outlines the UN's current priorities in countering violent extremism.*

United Nations, Security Council, 4688th Meeting. (2003). *High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism (S/RES/1456(2003))*. Retrieved 20 July 2017 from: https://undocs.org/S/RES/1456(2003)

> *Resolution 1456 of the UN Security Council aims to suppress any organizations, individuals, and/or Member States that support terrorist organizations financially and/or with other resources. It further calls upon the Counter-Terrorism Committee to intensify its efforts in combatting terrorism and to receive reports from Member States pertaining to terrorist activities in their territories. This document sets into motion a very important precedent: urging collaboration*

between Member States and the UN to curb terrorist financing. This collaboration entails information-sharing, tracking of financial transfers, and financial support.

United Nations, Security Council, 6959th Meeting. (2013). *Somalia (S/RES/2102 (2013))*. Retrieved 19 July 2017 from: http://undocs.org/S/RES/2102(2013)
> *Security Council resolution 2102 established the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). This resolution serves as the foundational document for the mission, whose mandate includes: the ensuring of security sector reform, the disengagement and disarmament of combatants, and coordinating international donor support. Evaluating UNSOM's achievements in light of the mandate outlined by this resolution will enable delegates to determine shortcomings, assess loopholes, and identify other factors that hinder the implementation and effectiveness of the mission.*

United Nations, Security Council, 7272nd Meeting. (2014). *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/2178 (2014))*. Retrieved 20 July 2017 from: https://undocs.org/S/RES/2178(2014)
> *Resolution 2178 outlines concerns about the proliferation of global terrorist networks, the radicalization of young people, continual recruitment efforts, and financial support for terrorist activities. It calls for Member States to increase cooperation efforts to end the flow of foreign fighters to terrorist organizations. It echoes resolution 1373, emphasizing that Member States must bring suspected terrorists to justice. The resolution also requires Member States to implement specific measures to better address terrorism across borders, such as having access to passenger information for local airlines, and collaborating with INTERPOL to intensify efforts to identify and apprehend transnational terrorists. Delegates should be familiar with this resolution, as it draws attention to the connection between terrorism and extremism, and mentions specific action items, like closer security cooperation and information-sharing among Member States, that can be used to depress the efforts of international terrorist organizations.*

United Nations, Security Council, 7968th Meeting. (2017). *The Situation in Somalia (S/RES/2358 (2017))* [Resolution]. Retrieved 19 July 2017 from: http://undocs.org/S/RES/2358(2017)
> *This is the most recent resolution of the UN Security Council extending the Mandate of UNSOM. The worsening of the political and security crisis in Somalia, along with the breakdown of the electoral process in the country, prompted the UN Security Council to extend the mandate of the mission. This resolution serves to reaffirm UNSOM's continual importance and highlights the progress and shortcomings of the mission thus far. Some of the successes of the mission include helping to determine the possibility of a famine early and supporting reconciliation between communities and former extremists. Delegates will benefit from a mission overview and the plans to move forward, amid a continual rise of terrorism and violent extremism in Somalia.*

Bibliography

African Union Mission in Somalia. (2017). *AMISOM Mandate* [Website]. Retrieved 16 July 2017 from: http://amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate/

African Union Mission in Somalia. (2017, August 26). *AMISOM soldiers undergo Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Training in Baidoa*. Retrieved 28 August 2017 from: http://amisom-au.org/2016/08/amisom-soldiers-undergo-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-training-in-baidoa/

African Union Mission in Somalia. (2017). *Kenya-KDF* [Website]. Retrieved 8 August 2017 from: http://amisom-au.org/kenya-kdf/

Ali, A. (2017). *Radicalization Process in the Horn of Africa – Phases and Relevant Factors*. Institute for strategic, political, security and economic consultancy. Retrieved 28 September 2017 from: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/87744/ispsw.pdf

Anderson, D. & J. McKnight. (2015). Kenya at war: Al-Shabaab and its enemies in Eastern Africa. *African Affairs*, 114 (454): 1–27. Retrieved 8 August 2017 from: https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/afraf/adu082

Burke, J. (2017, July 26). Al-Shabaab militants ban starving Somalis from accessing aid. *The Guardian*. Retrieved 9 August 2017 from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/27/al-shabaab-militants-ban-starving-somalis-from-accessing-aid

Cachalia, R., et al. (2016). *The dynamics of youth radicalization in Africa.* Institute for Security Studies. Retrieved 28 September 2017 from: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/paper296-1.pdf

Chinese military base takes shape in Djibouti. Financial Times. (2017, August 13). Retrieved 25 August 2017 from: https://www.ft.com/content/bcba2820-66e1-11e7-8526-7b38dcaef614

Council on Foreign Relations. (2017). *Global Conflict Tracker: Al-Shabab in Somalia*. Retrieved 22 July 2017 from: https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#!/conflict/al-shabab-in-somalia

Dickinson, E. (2010, September 23). How much turf does the Somali government really control?. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved 8 August 2017 from: http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/09/23/how-much-turf-does-the-somali-government-really-control/

Djibouti finalising deal for Saudi Arabian military base. Financial Times. (2017, August 14). Retrieved 25 August 2017 from: https://www.ft.com/content/c8f63492-dc14-11e6-9d7c-be108f1c1dce

Ethiopia and Eritrea blame each other for border clash. BBC. (2016, June 13). Retrieved 17 August 2017 from: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36515503

Ethiopia withdraws troops in Somalia over 'lack of support'. BBC. (2016, October 26). Retrieved 9 August 2017 from: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37775555

Federal Republic of Somalia. (2016). *National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism*. Retrieved 6 August 2017 from: http://www.radiomuqdisho.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/CVE-Strategy-26-August-English.pdf

Global Network of Religions for Children. (2017). *GNRC Annual Report 2016/2017*. Retrieved 28 September 2017 from: https://gnrc.net/images/zdocs/GNRC-Annual-Report-16-17-Singles-25-04-17.pdf

Hoehne, M. (2015). *Between Somaliland and Puntland: Marginalization, militarization and conflicting political visions.* Rift Valley Institute. Retrieved 16 August 2016 from: http://riftvalley.net/publication/between-somaliland-and-puntland#.WaSEUz6GOUl

Human Rights Watch. (2014). *"The Power These Men Have Over Us": Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by African Union Forces in Somalia*. Retrieved 10 August 2017 from: https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/09/08/power-these-men-have-over-us/sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-african-union-forces

Human Rights Watch. (2015). *Somalia: Events of 2015*. Retrieved 9 August 2017 from: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/somalia

International Maritime Organization, Maritime Safety Division. (2015). *Djibouti Code of Conduct*. Retrieved 18 August 2017 from: http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PIU/Documents/DCoC%20Newsletter%20(2015).pdf

International Organization for Migration. (2014). *EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (Khartoum Process)* [Website]. Retrieved 18 August 2017 from: https://www.iom.int/eu-horn-africa-migration-route-initiative-khartoum-process

Jacobs, A. & Perlez, J. (2017, February 25). U.S. Wary of Its New Neighbor in Djibouti: A Chinese Naval Base. *The New York Times*. Retrieved 21 August 2017 from: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/25/world/africa/us-djibouti-chinese-naval-base.html?mcubz=3

Kenya: Operation Linda Nchi – Kenya's Endless War. (2015. October 16). AllAfrica. Retrieved 8 August 2017 from: http://allafrica.com/stories/201510170130.html

Kenya Says Police Killed Most Wanted Al-Shabaab Commander. (2017, August 19). AllAfrica. Retrieved 19 August 2017 from: http://allafrica.com/stories/201708190069.html

Korybko, A. (2016, December 9). Hybrid Wars in the Horn of Africa: Ethiopia-Eritrea, "Greater Somalia". *Centre for Research on Globalization.* Retrieved 6 August 2017 from: http://www.globalresearch.ca/hybrid-wars-in-the-horn-of-africa-ethiopia-eritrea-greater-somalia/5561376

League of Nations. (1937). *Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism*. Retrieved 9 August 2017 from: https://www.wdl.org/en/item/11579/view/1/1/

Lewis, M. (2010). *Somaliland vs. Puntland*. GeoCurrents. Retrieved 16 August 2016 from: http://www.geocurrents.info/geopolitics/somaliland-vs-puntland

Masters, J. & Sergie M. A. (2015). *Al-Shabab.* Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 8 August 2017 from: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab

Meseret, E. (2015, December 22). UN official: Somalia is no longer a failed state. *Business Insider*. Retrieved 10 August 2017 from: http://www.businessinsider.com/ap-un-official-says-somalia-is-no-longer-a-failed-state-2015-12

Ploch, L., et al. (2011). *Piracy off the Horn of Africa*. United States Congressional Research Service. Retrieved 20 August 2017 from: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40528.pdf

Somalia - Most-failed state: Twenty-five years of chaos in the Horn of Africa. (2016, September 10). The Economist. Retrieved 11 August 2017 from: https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21706522-twenty-five-years-chaos-horn-africa-most-failed-state

Somalia: Tension Rises Between Puntland and Somaliland in Sanaag. (2016, July 21). AllAfrica. Retrieved 14 August 2017 from: http://allafrica.com/stories/201607210824.html

United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia. (2016). *Voices of Al-Shabaab: Understanding former combatants from the Baidoa Reintegration Center* [Report]. Retrieved 15 August 2017 from: https://unsom.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/voices_of_al-shabaab_understanding_former_combatants_from_the_baidoa_reintegration_center.pdf

United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia. (2017). *Donor Coordination* [Website]. Retrieved 16 August 2017 from: https://unsom.unmissions.org/donor-coordination

United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia. (2017). *Mandate* [Website]. Retrieved 19 July 2017 from: https://unsom.unmissions.org/mandate

United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia. (2017). *Police Section* [Website]. Retrieved 19 July 2017 from: https://unsom.unmissions.org/unsom-rolsig-police-section

United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia. (2017). *Rule of Law and Security* [Website]. Retrieved 14 August 2017 from: https://unsom.unmissions.org/unsom-rolsig-police-section

United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia. (2017, August 22). *UNSOM Holds Training on Sexual and Gender-Based Violence for South West State Police Officers* [News Article]. Retrieved 22 August 2017 from: https://unsom.unmissions.org/unsom-holds-training-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-south-west-state-police-officers

United Nations, Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force. (n.d). *About the Task Force* [Website]. Retrieved 11 November 2017 from: https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/about-task-force

United Nations, Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force. (n.d). *Entities* [Website]. Retrieved 11 November 2017 from: https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/structure

United Nations, Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force. (n.d). *UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy* [Website]. Retrieved 5 August 2017 from: https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy

United Nations, Department of Public Information. (2016, July 7). *Security Council extends Mandate of African Union Mission in Somalia, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2297 (2016) (SC/12436)* [Meetings Coverage]. Retrieved on 10 August 2017 from: https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12436.doc.htm

United Nations, Department of Public Information. (2017, January 9). *In opinion piece, Secretary-General António Guterres shares new vision for UN* [News Article]. Retrieved on 6 August 2017 from: https://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55931#.WYe9btPyuuW

United Nations, Department of Public Information. (2017). *Terrorism* [Report]. Retrieved 6 August 2017 from: http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/terrorism/sg%20high-level%20panel%20report-terrorism.htm

United Nations, Department of Public Information. (2017, May 23). *UN Chief, Security Council strongly condemn terrorist attack on Manchester concert* [News Article]. Retrieved 6 August 2017 from: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=56819#.WYfAkdPyuuV

United Nations, General Assembly. Fifty-First Session. (1997). *Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism* (*A/RES/51/210).* [Resolution]. Adopted on the report of the Sixth Committee A/51/631. Retrieved 11 August 2017 from: http://undocs.org/A/RES/51/210

United Nations, General Assembly, Fifty-fourth session. (1999). *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (A/RES/54/109).* Adopted on the report of the Sixth Committee (A/54/615). Retrieved 27 July 2017 from: http://undocs.org/A/RES/54/109

United Nations, General Assembly, Sixtieth Session. (2006). *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy* (*A/RES/60/288)* [Resolution]. Adopted without reference to a Main Committee (A/60/L.62). Retrieved 19 July 2017 from: http://undocs.org/A/RES/60/288

United Nations, General Assembly. Sixty-Seventh Session. (2013). *Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (A/RES/67/99)* [Resolution]. Adopted on the report of the Sixth Committee (A/67/473). Retrieved 10 August 2017 from: http://undocs.org/A/RES/67/99

United Nations, General Assembly, Seventieth session. (2015). *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism: Report of the Secretary-General (A/70/674).* Retrieved 16 July 2017 from: http://undocs.org/A/70/674

United Nations, General Assembly. (2016). *The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Review (A/RES/70/291)* [Report] Retrieved 10 August 2017 from: http://undocs.org/A/RES/70/291

United Nations & Government of Switzerland. (2016). *Geneva Conference on Preventing Violent Extremism – The Way Forward: Concept Note*. Retrieved 19 July 2017 from: https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/sites/www.un.org.counterterrorism.ctitf/files/Geneva%20PVE%20Conference%20Concept%20Note%20Final.pdf

United Nations, Security Council, 4385th Meeting. (2001). *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/1373 (2001)).* Retrieved 20 July 2017 from: http://undocs.org/S/RES/1373(2001)

United Nations, Security Council, 4688th Meeting. (2003). *High-level meeting of the Security Council: combating terrorism (S/RES/1456 (2003)).* Retrieved 20 July 2017 from: https://undocs.org/S/RES/1456(2003)

United Nations, Security Council, 5261st Meeting (2005). *Threats to international peace and security (Security Council Summit 2005) (S/RES/1624(2005))* [Resolution]. Retrieved 20 July 2017 from: http://undocs.org/S/RES/1624(2005)

United Nations, Security Council. (2013). *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution 2060 (2012): Somalia*. Retrieved 12 August 2017 from: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_413.pdf

United Nations, Security Council, 6959th Meeting. (2013). *Somalia (S/RES/2102 (2013))*. Retrieved 19 July 2017 from: http://undocs.org/S/RES/2102(2013)

United Nations, Security Council, 7272nd Meeting. (2014). *Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts (S/RES/2178 (2014))*. Retrieved 20 July 2017 from: http://www.undocs.org/S/RES/2178(2014)

United Nations, Security Council, 7491st Meeting. (2015). *Somalia (S/RES/2232 (2015))*. Retrieved 20 July 2017 from: http://undocs.org/S/RES/2232(2015)

United Nations, Security Council, 7541st Meeting. (2015). *Somalia (S/RES/2244 (2015))*. Retrieved 20 July 2017 from: http://undocs.org/S/RES/2244(2015)

United Nations, Security Council, 7554th Meeting. (2015). *Somalia (S/RES/2246 (2015))*. Retrieved 20 July 2017 from: http://undocs.org/S/RES/2246(2015)

United Nations, Security Council, 7731st Meeting. (2016). *The situation in Somalia (S/RES/2297 (2016))*. Retrieved 20 July 2017 from: http://undocs.org/S/RES/2297(2016)

United Nations, Security Council. (2017). *Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia (S/2017/408)*. Retrieved 20 July 2017 from: http://undocs.org/S/2017/408

United Nations, Security Council. (2017, May 26). *Security Council Authorizes African Union to Maintain Mission's Deployment in Somalia until 31 August, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2355 (2017) (SC/12843)* [Meetings Coverage]. Retrieved 19 July 2017 from: http://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12843.doc.htm

United Nations, Security Council. (2017, June 19). *Briefing Security Council, Chair of Peacebuilding Commission Underlines New Focus on Reviewing Working Methods to Enhance Efficiency, Flexibility* [Meetings Coverage]. Retrieved 19 July 2017 from: http://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12877.doc.htm

United Nations, Security Council. (2017, June 21). *Security Council Welcomes Deployment of Joint Force to Combat Terrorism Threat, Transnational Crime in Sahel, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2359 (2017)* [Meetings Coverage]. Retrieved 19 July 2017 from: http://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12881.doc.htm

United Nations, Security Council, Counter-Terrorism Committee. (2017). *About the Counter-Terrorism Committee* [Website]. Retrieved on 11 August 2017 from: https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/about-us/

United States Navy, Camp Lemonnier. (2017). *Installation Information* [Website]. Retrieved 24 August 2017 from: https://cnic.navy.mil/regions/cnreurafswa/installations/camp_lemonnier_djibouti.html

Who are Somalia's al-Shabab?. (2016, December 9). BBC. Retrieved 8 August 2017 from: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689